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Previous studies of the U.S. Great Depression find that increased taxation contributed little to either
the dramatic downturn or the slow recovery.  These studies include only one type of capital taxation:
a business profits tax.  The contribution is much greater when the analysis includes other types of capital
taxes.  A general equilibrium model extended to include taxes on dividends, property, capital stock,
and excess and undistributed profits predicts patterns of output, investment, and hours worked more
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Although there is no general agreement on the primary causes of the U.S. Great Depression—
the sharp economic contraction in the early 1930s and the subsequent slow recovery—many
do agree that ﬁscal policy played only a minor role. This conventional view is based on
both empirical and theoretical analyses of the period. Although federal government spend-
ing notably increased during the 1930s, the data show that as a share of gross domestic
product (GDP), it did not increase enough to have had a large impact (Brown, 1956). At
the same time, income tax rates increased sharply, but taxes were ﬁled by few households
and paid by even fewer (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1916–2010). Feeding estimates
of spending and tax rates into a standard neoclassical growth model, Cole and Ohanian
(1999) conﬁrm that the impact of ﬁscal policy during the 1930s was too small to matter.
Here, I challenge that conventional view.
My challenge is based on an examination of all types of taxation during the 1930s. As
is standard, Cole and Ohanian (1999) and others limit their attention to taxes on wages
and business proﬁts. I look as well at taxes on capital stock, property, sales, excess proﬁts,
undistributed proﬁts, and dividends. When these overlooked taxes are incorporated into
the neoclassical framework, the model predicts patterns in aggregate data that are much
closer to those in U.S. data than previous studies have found. A crucial factor for the
model predictions is the tax treatment of capital income.1 If tax rates on undistributed
and distributed proﬁts (i.e., dividends) are equated, then the impact of taxation is found
to be small. If they are not assumed to be equal and are set at levels observed in the 1930s,
then the impact of taxation is found to be large.
Perhaps surprisingly, given that capital taxation plays a central role in my analysis, a
1 Standard practice is to model capital taxes as taxes on proﬁts. See, for example, business cycle
studies of Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994) and Great Depression studies in Kehoe and Prescott
(2007).
1key policy change in the decade is the increase in tax rates on individual incomes. But in-
dividual incomes include corporate dividends. Although few households paid income taxes
in the 1930s, those who did earned almost all of the income distributed by corporations
and unincorporated businesses. Thus, increasing the tax rate on dividends would naturally
have had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on economic activity.
Besides including overlooked taxes, I extend the neoclassical growth model to allow
for both tangible and intangible business investment (as do McGrattan and Prescott,
2010). I do this because the U.S. tax code allows businesses to reduce taxable income by
expensing intangible investments like advertising expenditures, research and development
(R&D), and labor devoted to building up businesses. I assume that part of intangible
investment is ﬁnanced by owners of capital and is expensed from corporate proﬁts rather
than capitalized. The remainder is ﬁnanced by unincorporated business owners who are
paid less than their marginal value product with the expectation of realizing future proﬁts
or capital gains.2 Making the distinction between tangible and intangible capital explicit
in the model allows it to better capture the actual eﬀect of taxes.
And it does. My model predicts that higher taxes during the 1930s led to a dramatic
decline in tangible investment, similar to that observed in the United States, with the
primary cause being the rise of the eﬀective tax rate on dividends. The pattern of invest-
ment is a steep decline in the early part of the decade, followed by some recovery and
another steep decline in 1937. The primary cause of the second decline is the introduction
of the undistributed proﬁts tax. Overall, the model predicts 1929–1933 declines in GDP
and hours worked that account, respectively, for 41 and 48 percent of the actual declines.
These are improvements over the Cole and Ohanian (1999) model predictions—four times
larger for GDP and three times larger for hours. The model also predicts correctly that
equity values should have fallen by about 30 percent over the decade.
2 McGrattan and Prescott (2010) refer to the equity accumulated by business owners as sweat equity.
2My model’s quantitative results, especially for the early 1930s, do depend somewhat
on how household expectations about future income tax rates are modeled, but sensitivity
analysis shows that the main results are not overturned as I vary assumptions about
expectations. The period was rife with institutional uncertainty. Major changes in the
U.S. tax code were not enacted until the Revenue Act of 1932. However, as early as
February 1930, President Herbert Hoover warned that large tax increases would follow if
Congress enacted its proposed spending projects. Theoretically, anticipated tax increases
on future distributions lead to immediate increases in current distributions and immediate
declines in business investments and equity values. Regardless of the uncertainty, since
tax rate increases are large, the eﬀects on economic activity are too.
Although the results show that tax policy had a major impact on economic activity in
the 1930s, it could not have been the only factor contributing to the large contraction and
slow recovery of the 1930s. This is demonstrated, for example, by the initial consumption
predictions, which do not line up well with the data. U.S. consumption fell sharply in
the early part of the 1930s, yet both Cole and Ohanian’s (1999) and my model miss that
drop; the models actually predict an initial rise. Expectations of higher future capital
tax rates imply a sharp initial increase in distributions of business incomes, accomplished
by decreasing tangible investment. Increased distributions then lead, counterfactually, to
increased consumption, which falls only when higher sales and excise taxes are imposed.
Adding New Deal policies (as in the 2004 work of Cole and Ohanian) would help further
account for the time series patterns in the later part of the decade. But we need other
ways to account for the pattern of consumption in the early part.3
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the evidence in support of the
conventional view that ﬁscal policy played only a minor role in the Great Depression. In
3 Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) apply a business cycle accounting exercise to the 1930s and
show that models with frictions manifested primarily as eﬃciency wedges and labor wedges are needed
to account for ﬂuctuations in this period. The inclusion of intangible capital and taxes implies time
variation in these key wedges, but they are not large enough; the model still cannot quantitatively
account for all of the ﬂuctuations.
3Section 3, I redo the exercise of Cole and Ohanian (1999) with a version of the neoclassical
growth model that is more suited to studying ﬁscal policy in the 1930s. I show that the
results change dramatically, especially if taxes on dividends and undistributed proﬁts are
included separately in the analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Conventional View
I begin by reviewing work in support of the conventional view that ﬁscal policy in the
1930s had only a small eﬀect on economic activity.
The standard reference for those studying ﬁscal policy in the 1930s is the work of
Brown (1956). His main conclusion is that “ﬁscal policy, then, seems to have been an
unsuccessful recovery device in the ’thirties—not because it did not work, but because it
was not tried” (p. 863).4 Brown bases his conclusion on estimates of the impact of ﬁscal
policy on aggregate demand, making assumptions about households’ marginal propensity
to consume and save.
As Brown’s conclusion makes clear, the focus of his study is in assessing the positive
role of ﬁscal policy in promoting a recovery from the Depression rather than in assessing
its role in the downturn of the early 1930s. The lack of attention paid to the contraction in
the early 1930s is probably due to the fact that major changes in tax policy—which would
have had a negative eﬀect—were not enacted until 1932, and even then, most Americans
were not required to ﬁle tax returns.
In Table 1, I show the number of taxable individual income tax returns (Forms 1040
and 1041) ﬁled in the years 1929 through 1939. To provide some sense of the magnitudes,
I also list the midyear populations for this period. In 1929, for example, the population
4 In fact, Romer (2009) uses Brown’s (1956) evidence when proposing greater ﬁscal stimulus during
the 2008–2009 downturn. Brown’s (1956) work is also a standard reference for those who study the
impact of policy in the 1930s but abstract from changes in ﬁscal policy. See, for example, the work
of Bernanke (1983) and Romer (1992).














Table 1. Number of Taxable Individual Income Tax Returns
and Midyear Population, 1929–1930
was 122 million, but only 2.5 million individual income tax returns were ﬁled. At that
time, the typical household size was 3.3 persons, implying that only 6.8 percent of the
U.S. population were members of taxpaying households. In 1935, the number of taxpayers
had fallen to 2.1 million, while the population had risen to 127 million. In that year,
there were 39.5 million households, and therefore only 5.3 percent of the population were
members of taxpaying households. (See the work of Leven, Moulton, and Warburton, 1934,
and Kneeland, 1938.)
The most closely related work to the current study is the analysis of Cole and Ohanian
(1999) who, like Brown, write oﬀ ﬁscal policy’s role in the Great Depression. Cole and
Ohanian compare deterministic steady states of a neoclassical growth model with govern-
ment spending and tax rates set at 1929 levels and 1939 levels. Cole and Ohanian choose
these years because they are interested in accounting for the weak recovery in U.S. labor
5input, which was still well below trend in 1939. They ﬁnd that the labor input predicted
by the model is lower than trend by only 4 percent in 1939 and conclude that “ﬁscal policy
shocks account for only about 20 percent of the weak 1934–39 recovery” (p. 12).
Here, I extend the analysis of Cole and Ohanian (1999) slightly by computing the
entire equilibrium path for the period 1929–1939 and conﬁrm their main ﬁnding. The
equilibrium path of their model provides a useful benchmark for comparison to the model
studied later that includes overlooked taxes and intangible capital.
The model Cole and Ohanian (1999) use is a standard neoclassical growth model with
distortionary taxes on wages and proﬁts. Given the initial capital stock k0, the problem
for the stand-in household is to choose consumption c, investment x, and hours worked h





subject to the constraints
ct + xt = rtkt + wtht + κt − ζt (2.2)
kt+1 = [(1 − δ)kt + xt]/(1 + η), (2.3)
where variables are written in per capita terms, Nt = N0(1 + η)t is the population in t,
which grows at rate η, β is the time discount factor, and δ is the depreciation rate of
capital. Capital is paid rent rt, labor is paid wage wt, and per capita transfers are given
by κt. Taxes are summarized by the variable ζt in (2.2); below, I will specify a speciﬁc
formula for ζt.




where capital letters denote aggregates and θ is capital’s share of output. The parameter
Zt is labor-augmenting technical change that is assumed to grow at a constant rate, Zt =
6(1 + γ)t. The ﬁrm rents capital and labor. If proﬁts are maximized, then the rental rates
are equal to the marginal products. The goods market clears, so Nt(ct + xt + gt) = Yt,
where gt is per capita government spending.
A standard practice in the business cycle literature is to assume that taxes are levied on
capital and labor, with excess revenues rebated to households. Capital taxes are modeled
as taxes on proﬁts, and thus,
ζt = τpt (rt − δ)kt + τhtwtht, (2.5)
where τpt is the tax rate on capital income (that is, proﬁts), and τht is the tax rate on
labor income.
In their analysis of the U.S. Great Depression, Cole and Ohanian (1999, p. 12) conclude
that plausible estimates of the increase in the tax rates τpt and τht are not large enough
to have much of an eﬀect in the 1930s. They use estimates of Joines (1981) and compare
the deterministic steady state of the model with 1929 tax rates to the deterministic steady
state of the model with 1939 tax rates. Joines’ estimates of the tax rates on capital and
labor are 29.5 and 3.5 percent, respectively, in 1929 and 42.5 and 8.3 percent, respectively,
in 1939.
As do Cole and Ohanian (1999) and others in the business cycle literature, I use
the tax rates on capital and labor estimated by Joines (1981)—namely, his MTRK1 and
MTRL1—as inputs for τpt and τht, along with a measure of detrended real government
spending. Detrended spending is real government consumption divided by the population
and the growth in labor-augmenting technical change (1+γt). For the quantitative results
that I report below, I assume that households have full knowledge of the path of spending
and tax rates, but this assumption is not critical for the ﬁndings.5
5 Because the actual spending and tax rate paths are the expected future states, I use the low frequency
trends of the observed time series. Doing this does not aﬀect my ﬁndings for the basic growth model
and helps in computing equilibria for the extended growth model described later. See the appendix
for more details. See McGrattan (2010) for the results of a sensitivity analysis.
7For my simulation, I use a ﬂow utility function given by
U (c,h) = log(c) + ψ log(1 − h),
where ψ is a parameter governing the disutility of work. To be consistent with Cole and
Ohanian, I assume that the capital share θ is 0.33, the growth rate of the population η is 1
percent, and the growth rate of technology γ is 1.9 percent. Values of ψ, δ, and β are then
set to ensure that 1929 levels of per capita hours, per capita real investment, and the per
capita real capital stock in the model are consistent with U.S. data; this implies ψ = 2.33,
δ = 0.05, and β = 0.984. (In McGrattan 2010, I vary assumptions about parameters and
household expectations and show that the variation hardly aﬀects the results.)
In Figures 1–4, I plot this basic growth model’s predictions for detrended real invest-
ment, per capita hours, detrended real GDP, and detrended real consumption from 1929
to 1939. To detrend investment, GDP, and consumption, I divide each series by popu-
lation and growth in labor-augmenting technical change (that is, (1 + γ)t). The series
are compared with U.S. time series that are detrended in the same way. The series are
indexed so that 1929 equals 100. (See the appendix for more details on data construction
and sources.)
As expected, the diﬀerences between the model’s predictions and the U.S. time series
are large. Between 1929 and 1933, investment falls only 16 percent in the model but
70 percent in the United States. The model predicts a 4 percent decline in per capita
hours between 1929 and 1933, but the actual decline was 27 percent. For GDP, the model
predicts a 3 percent decline between 1929 and 1933, but the actual decline was 34 percent.
Model consumption rises initially, whereas in the data consumption falls. By 1933, model
consumption is below trend by only 1 percent, and actual consumption is below trend by
25 percent. By 1939, economic activity in both the model and data are below trend, but
the predicted diﬀerences are large. For example, U.S. hours are 21 percent below trend,
but the model predicts that hours should have been only 4 percent below trend. This is
8what Cole and Ohanian (1999) found when doing steady state calculations. These large
diﬀerences are consistent with the conventional view that ﬁscal policy had little to do with
the dramatic contraction in these years.
3. An Extended View
I now consider an extension of the basic growth model that includes two factors necessary
for studying U.S. tax policy in the 1930s. The ﬁrst is a more comprehensive speciﬁcation
of taxes. The second is a distinction between tangible and intangible investments. Adding
these overlooked factors, I demonstrate that the extended model better predicts the data
of the 1930s.
3.1. The Extensions
First, I identify and justify the two overlooked factors to be included in the analysis.
The primary one is the inclusion of taxes on property, capital stock, excess proﬁts,
undistributed proﬁts, dividends, and sales in addition to taxes on wages and ordinary
proﬁts.6 At the beginning of the 1930s, the source of most government revenues was
indirect business taxes on property, sales, and excise. Over the decade, as deﬁcits grew at
all levels of government, legislators increased tax rates, especially rates of individual and
corporate income taxes and sales and excise taxes. Although the tax revenues on incomes
never exceeded indirect business taxes, these taxes directly impacted almost all capital
owners in the United States.
The other factor I add to the basic growth model is the distinction between tangible
and intangible investments. In order to accurately assess the impact of taxes, especially
taxes on capital income, it is important to take into account the fact that a signiﬁcant
6 Brown (1949) shows that, when used in combination, the capital stock tax and the excess proﬁts tax
acted like a tax on corporate proﬁts, which is how I model them.
9amount of capital investment is expensed and thus nontaxable; these include investments
in advertising, R&D, and organizational capital. As a trustee of the Museum of Science
and Industry noted in 1936, with taxes rising, “many manufacturers have concluded that
it will be better business judgment to spend money for business promotion, advertising,
newspaper campaigns, technical research, etc., in which they get full beneﬁt of each dollar
in building up business” (New York Times, July 23, 1936). This shift from tangible
to intangible investments is also evident in statistics on R&D employment. For example,
Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) report that between 1933 and 1940, employment of scientists
and engineers in two-digit manufacturing industries nearly tripled, rising from 10,927 to
27,777, and the number of scientiﬁc personnel per 1,000 wage earners doubled, rising from
1.93 to 3.67.
3.2. The Basic Setup
Now I describe how the basic growth model must be changed to accommodate my exten-
sions.


























where θ is the tangible capital share of output and φ is the intangible capital share of
output. Firms produce ﬁnal output y using their tangible capital k1
T, intangible capital
kI, and labor h1. Firms produce intangible capital xI—such as new brands, R&D, and
patents—using tangible capital k2
T, intangible capital kI, and labor h2.
Note that kI is an input to both sectors; it is not split between them, as tangible
capital and labor are. A brand name is used both to sell ﬁnal goods and services and to
10develop new brands. Patents are used by the producers and the researchers. (See the work
of McGrattan and Prescott, 2010, for the aggregation theory underlying this technology.)





βt [logct + ψ log(1 − ht)]Nt
subject to several constraints:
ct + xTt + qtxIt = rTtkTt + rItkIt + wtht + κt − ζt
kT,t+1 = [(1 − δT)kTt + xTt]/(1 + η) (3.3)
kI,t+1 = [(1 − δI)kIt + xIt]/(1 + η) (3.4)
and nonnegativity constraints on investment, xTt ≥ 0 and xIt ≥ 0. Here, as before, all
variables are in per capita units, and population grows at rate η. The relative price of
intangible investment and consumption is q; the rental rates for tangible and intangible
capital are denoted by rT and rI, respectively; and the wage rate for labor, w. As before,
inputs are paid their marginal products.
Since the capital taxation studied here aﬀects only business activity, I assume that
nonbusiness output ynt less nonbusiness investment xnt is (exogenously) included with
transfers to households κt. I also assume that hours ht include hours in nonbusiness
production hnt. (See the time paths of nonbusiness activity in the appendix, Table A.2.)
As do McGrattan and Prescott (2010), I assume that intangible investment is ﬁnanced
partly by the owners of capital and partly by the suppliers of labor; the distinction matters
because the tax treatment of capital and labor is diﬀerent. Let χ denote the fraction of
intangible investment ﬁnanced by shareholders. In this case, the amount χqxI is ﬁnanced
by owners of capital and is therefore expensed from accounting proﬁts rather than capi-
talized. The amount (1 − χ)qxI is sweat investment which is ﬁnanced by business owners
who devote uncompensated time to building up their businesses.
11GDP in this economy is the sum of private consumption, tangible investment, public
consumption, and nonbusiness investment; in per capita terms, GDP is c + xT + g + xn.
Gross domestic income (GDI) is the sum of capital income less expensed investment, rTkT+
rIkI− χqxI, labor income less sweat investment wh− (1− χ)qxI, and nonbusiness capital
income yn − whn.
3.3. Taxes
Next, I modify the way taxes are modeled by including three additional taxes on capital
income—property, undistributed proﬁts, and dividends—as well as taxes on consumption.
The formula for per capita taxes paid by households then becomes
ζt = τctct + τht (wtht − (1 − χ)qtxIt) + τktkTt + τut ((1 + η)kT,t+1 − kTt)
+ τpt{rTtkTt + rItkIt − δTkTt − qtxIt − τktkTt}
+ τdt{rTtkTt + rItkIt − xTt − qtxIt
− τktkTt − τut ((1 + η)kT,t+1 − kTt)
− τpt (rTtkTt + rItkIt − δTkTt − qtxIt − τktkTt)}, (3.5)
where τct is the tax rate on consumption, τht is the tax rate on labor income, τkt is the tax
rate on property, τut is the tax rate on undistributed proﬁts, τpt is the tax rate on proﬁts,
and τdt is the tax rate on dividends. Note that taxable income for the tax on proﬁts is
net of depreciation and property tax, and taxable income for the tax on dividends is net
of taxes on proﬁts, property, and undistributed proﬁts.
For my numerical experiments, I again need to choose time series for spending and
tax rates in the model. Here, I describe those choices brieﬂy. (In the appendix and in
McGrattan 2010, I describe them in more detail.)
For government spending and the tax rate on wages, I use the same inputs as in the
basic growth model analyzed by Cole and Ohanian (1999). (See the appendix, Table A.1.)
12Table A.3 shows the additional taxes used in simulating the extended model, namely, time
series for τpt, τdt, τkt, and τct.7
I replace the tax rate on proﬁts used in the standard model by an estimate of the tax
rate on normal business proﬁts plus an estimate of the eﬀective rate due to the capital
stock tax in combination with the excess proﬁts tax. For normal business proﬁts, I use the
statutory corporate income tax rate.
These changes are motivated by the actual U.S. tax system. A tax on capital stock and
excess proﬁts was in eﬀect in 1933 and subsequent years and, according to Brown (1949),
was eﬀectively a tax on proﬁts. Companies had to declare a value for their capital stock,
and a tax was assessed on that value. To avoid having companies declare a capital value
that was too low, the government used an excess proﬁts tax as a penalty. For example, in
1934, if proﬁts exceeded 12.5 percent of the declared capital stock value, companies paid a
5 percent tax on the excess proﬁts. To avoid this penalty, companies tended to declare a
high value for capital and paid roughly 2 percent of proﬁts because of this tax in addition
to their normal tax bill. (See the work of Brown, 1949.) For this reason, the tax rate listed
in Table A.3 is an estimate of the normal tax on proﬁts plus an additional 2 percent that
is indirectly assessed through the capital stock tax.
The tax on dividends τdt (the second column of Table A.3) is estimated as the average
marginal tax rate on U.S. dividends. This rate is a weighted average across income groups
of the additional tax assessed on an additional dollar of dividend income.
Also included in the analysis are taxes on property and consumption, which yielded
the bulk of government revenues during the entire decade of the 1930s. These are shown
in the last two columns of Table A.3. Estimates of these rates are constructed from taxes
on imports and production. in the national income and product accounts (NIPA).
7 For the extended model, household expectations are modeled as a probability distribution over ob-
served spending and tax rates for the years 1930–1939. Given that they are the basis of expectations,
I ﬁlter the actual series and use only the low frequencies. See the appendix for more details.
13For the tax on undistributed proﬁts, τut, which was in eﬀect for the years 1936–1938,
I use an eﬀective rate of 5 percent. This estimate yields revenues that are in line with
revenues reported in the U.S. Treasury’s Statistics of Income.
In the model, as in the United States, the treatment of tangible and intangible income
diﬀers, as can be seen from the formula (3.5). Taxes on property and undistributed proﬁts
are levied on tangible capital and tangible net investment. For the purposes of taxation of
proﬁts, tangible investment is not expensed, but intangible investment is. The asymmetric
treatment also aﬀects the incidence of the tax on dividends.
3.4. Expectations
Before I simulate the time series for the extended model, I need to describe households’
assumptions about future government spending and taxes. When analyzing the basic
growth model, I made an extreme assumption that households had perfect foresight of
rising taxes to get the maximal eﬀect, but I found that even in the extreme case, the
impact of ﬁscal policies was too small to matter. In the extended model, with taxes on many
diﬀerent sources of capital income and investments that are tax deductible, expectations
will play a more signiﬁcant role. Thus, here I detail my assumptions about expectations,
at least for my initial benchmark simulation.
Table 2 summarizes the benchmark parameterization of the process governing ﬁscal
policy. The table is a transition matrix with the current state, call it st, taking on values
listed in the rows of the table and the future state listed in the columns. In other words,
the states are the years 1929 through 1939. A current state of “1930” means that ﬁscal
policy in this state is the same as it was in the United States in 1930. I assume that
spending and tax rates are functions of st, for example, τdt = τd(st), and the functions are
read oﬀ Tables A.1 through A.3. Notice that most transitional probabilities in Table 2 are
zero (and so not listed). Transiting from the 1930 state, the only possible states for 1931
14are ﬁscal policies equivalent to U.S. policies observed in 1929, 1930, and 1931. Households
are assumed to put 1/3 weight on each of those possible future states.
The parameterization in Table 2 assumes that there is uncertainty in 1930–1931 and
again in 1936–1937 because of actual U.S. events. The initial uncertainty about tax and
spending policies early in the decade was not fully resolved until the U.S. Revenue Act of
1932 was enacted. Before then, households were warned that spending bills in Congress
could not be ﬁnanced out of current revenue streams. Newspapers throughout 1930 and
1931 included headlines like “Hoover Warns Congress to Economize or be Faced by Tax
Rise of 40 Per Cent” (New York Times, February 25, 1930). But households were not sure
if the government would raise taxes during a depression, as the following excerpt indicates.
Some, who were pessimistically inclined, believed it would be necessary to recom-
mend to the next Congress even higher taxes for 1931 than those carried in the
1928 revenue law, in order to avert a serious deﬁcit at the end of the ﬁscal year
1931. The more general belief, however, is that the 1928 rates will be permitted
to stand even if a deﬁcit results, as it is felt that a move to increase taxes would
further accentuate the economic depression which is given much concern. It was
indicated at the Treasury that Secretary Mellon felt it was too early to talk with
deﬁniteness about the tax situation but that he would go into a full discussion
of the subject . . . in his annual report in Congress in December. (New York
Times, August 22, 1930)
Households remained uncertain about the speciﬁcs of the ﬁnal bill until it was enacted and
signed in 1932. Then they knew that individuals faced large increases in marginal income
tax rates.
For several years thereafter, new revenue acts were introduced. In 1933, it was a
tax on capital stock and excess proﬁts (part of the National Industrial Recovery Act). In
1934, the main policy changes were designed to prevent tax avoidance. In 1935 increases in
surtaxes on individuals were made. The main change in 1936 was the introduction of the
undistributed proﬁts tax. This change was likely to have surprised most Americans, since
15Next Period’s Policy Like That of:




























Table 2. Transition Matrix for Benchmark Model Simulation
the tax was not proposed until a speech by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in March 1936.
Congress went along with the proposal, and the law was passed soon thereafter and made
applicable to income during the entire calendar year. In modeling expectations, I have
chosen parameters in the transition matrix of Table 2 consistent with the 1936 law being
a completely unanticipated change. After that, there is uncertainty about the permanence
of the undistributed proﬁts tax, which is modeled as a 1/2, 1/2 probability on staying with
the same policy (1936) or transiting to the next year (1937). This is done for 1937 as well,
since there was uncertainty about whether it would continue. In 1938, it was clear that
the undistributed proﬁts tax would be eliminated.
3.5. Model Predictions
Now I quantify the parameters of the extended model economy and rerun the numerical
16experiment done earlier for the basic growth model. I report the results of this simulation
and compare them with those of the basic growth model as well as to what actually
happened in the U.S. economy in the 1930s. In essence, this exercise demonstrates that
capital taxation did indeed play a signiﬁcant role in the U.S. Great Depression, both in
the deep contraction and in the slow recovery.
For my simulations, I assume, as before, that the utility function is logarithmic and
growth rates are given by γ = 0.019 and η = 0.01. The time series for nonbusiness activities
are set exogenously to be equal to U.S. values. (As noted earlier, the detrended paths of
nonbusiness hours, investment, and output are shown in Table A.2.) The parameter χ,
which governs the fraction of expensing done by capital owners, is set equal to 0.5 as in
McGrattan and Prescott (2010). I have no independent evidence for this parameter and
therefore check the implications for varying it below.
The remaining parameters are set so that aggregates in the model economy are equal
to their U.S. analogues in 1929. Speciﬁcally, I use values from U.S. data for real GDP,
real consumption, real tangible business investment, real tangible business capital, and
per capita hours. This implies parameter values of ψ = 2.053, β = 0.98, δT = 0.0357,
θ = 0.236, and φ = 0.113. Because the intangible depreciation rate and the share of
intangible capital in production φ cannot be separately identiﬁed, I normalize δI to 0 and
show in McGrattan (2010) that this choice is made without loss of generality.
Figures 5–8 show the extended model’s predictions for investment, hours, GDP, and
consumption, which are comparable to the basic growth model’s in Figures 1–4. A com-
parison of Figures 1 and 5 shows that disaggregating the capital tax rates makes a big
diﬀerence for the model’s prediction of measured investment (which is the sum of tangible
investment and nonbusiness investment). With the Joines’ (1981) tax rate on proﬁts only,
investment declines very gradually. With diﬀerent rates on proﬁts, dividends, and prop-
erty, the model predicts an immediate and sharp fall in measured investment (xT + xn),
17much like that in the U.S. economy. The primary determinant for the fall is expectations
about the future changes in the tax rate on dividends. In fact, with the tax rate on proﬁts
τpt and property τkt set equal and ﬁxed to 1929 levels, the picture changes little. The rea-
son for the large decline is that households anticipate large changes in the eﬀective return
to capital.
To see this, consider the households’ intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition for tangible
capital when nonnegativity constraints are not binding on investment:
(1+τut)(1−τdt)







where expectations are conditioned on the state st, ˆ β = β/(1 + γ), and variables with
hats are per capita series detrended by technology growth; for example, ˆ ct = ct/(1 + γ)t.8
If tax rates on dividends are constant, then the terms 1 − τdt and 1 − τdt+1 cancel. If
revenues are lump-sum rebated to households, then taxes on dividends have no eﬀect
because neither budget sets nor ﬁrst-order conditions change. Similarly, if households
have myopic expectations—by which I mean that every period they think the current tax
rates they are facing will be in place forever—then tax rates on dividends have no eﬀect
even if they do actually change. However, if households put some probability on changing
rates, then the terms 1 − τdt and 1 − τdt+1 do not cancel and the eﬀective rate of return
to capital is aﬀected. With tax rates rising, eﬀective rates of return are falling.9
Figure 6 shows hours per capita for the extended model and the U.S. data. The
pattern for the model is similar to the pattern of investment. Hours fall about 13 percent
between 1929 and 1933 in the model and about 27 percent in the United States. Thus,
the model accounts for 48 percent of the actual decline. Hours recover subsequently in
the model and by 1939 are roughly 5 percent below trend. In the data, hours are still
8 Intuition for the actual simulation is complicated by the fact that negativity constraints do bind in
many states of the world.
9 In a study of the U.S. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Chetty and Saez
(2005) provide empirical evidence that cuts in dividend taxes have large and immediate eﬀects on
payout policies of ﬁrms with high levels of taxable noninstitutional ownership.
18well below trend—about 20 percentage points—by 1939. Thus, although the predictions
in 1939 are similar to those of the basic growth model (Figure 2), the relative declines in
the ﬁrst part of the decade are signiﬁcantly larger in the extended model—on the order of
three times larger.
Figure 7 shows that the model predicts GDP to decline about as much as hours of
work between 1929 and 1933. The predicted fall is about 41 percent of the actual decline
in U.S. GDP—a magnitude that is roughly four times larger than the fall predicted by the
basic growth model (Figure 3).
The decline in model GDP is not greater because households consume more in the
early part of the decade. Figure 8 shows the model’s consumption path, which is rising
prior to 1932, whereas consumption actually fell continually between 1929 and 1933. The
optimal response to high future capital taxes is high current distributions of business
income.10 Taxes on consumption do rise during the 1930s, but not signiﬁcantly until after
1932.
The extended model has another channel for spending, namely, intangible investment,
but its price is also aﬀected by expected increases in tax rates. Figure 9 shows the extended
model’s patterns of business tangible and intangible investments. Notice that initially,
tangible investment falls as distributions are increased while intangible investment remains
ﬂat. The path of intangible investment depends critically on the amount of expensing done
by capital owners (χ). To see why, consider the (unconstrained) ﬁrst-order condition for
intangible capital:
qt[χ(1 − τpt)(1 − τdt) + (1 − χ)(1 − τht)]
(1 + τct)ˆ ct
= ˆ βEt
h 1
(1 + τct+1)ˆ ct+1
{(1 − τpt+1)(1 − τdt+1)rIt+1
10 The large deviation between consumption patterns in theory and data cannot be resolved by intro-
ducing the type of ﬁnancial frictions proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Taxes on dividends
have the same impact on economic activity as the agency costs in their model. Both impact the price
of capital, leading to declines in investment and increases in consumption.
19+ (1 − δI)qt+1[χ(1 − τpt+1)(1 − τdt+1) + (1 − χ)(1 − τht+1)]}
i
. (3.7)
If intangible capital is ﬁnanced by capital owners (χ = 1), then the returns on both types
of capital are aﬀected in the same way by the change in the tax rate on dividends (that is,
(1 − τdt+1)/(1 − τdt)). If intangible capital is ﬁnanced by owners deferring compensation
(χ = 0), then the relevant tax rate for expensing is τht. The benchmark simulation
has χ = 0.5 and, as is clear from Figure 9, the time series for intangible and tangible
investments are negatively correlated, implying some substitution between them.
Variation in intangible investment also enhances the model’s ability to match up with
U.S. data because it generates movements in eﬃciency and labor wedges, as called for
by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007). The eﬃciency wedge is the ratio of GDP to
(KT +Kn)1/3H2/3, where KT +Kn is the sum of aggregate tangible capital in the business
and nonbusiness sectors and H is total hours of work. The labor wedge is the ratio of
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption ψc/(1 − h) and labor
productivity measured as GDP divided by hours of work. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007) show that these wedges varied a lot during the 1930s, which is puzzling for standard
neoclassical theory. Using U.S. data to measure these wedges, I ﬁnd that the eﬃciency
wedge falls about 15 percent between 1929 and 1933 and then recovers by 1936, and the
labor wedge falls close to 30 percent between 1929 and 1933 remains low throughout the
decade. Performing the same exercise in the model, I do ﬁnd that both wedges vary over
the decade because intangible investment and capital vary. However, the movements in
intangible investments are not large enough to generate movements in the model wedges
comparable to those found in the data. The eﬃciency wedge constructed from the model
time series falls only 2 percent between 1929 and 1933 before recovering. The labor wedge
rises at ﬁrst and then falls roughly 11 percent over the decade.
Another important consequence of the increase in tax rates on dividends is the decline
in equity values. In Figure 10, I show the model’s prediction for the time series for the
20(detrended) real equity value, which in this case is equal to
Vt = (1 − τdt)[(1 + τut)KT,t+1 + (1 − τpt)qtKI,t+1],
where KT,t+1 and KI,t+1 are aggregate end-of-year tangible and intangible capital stocks,
respectively. Prior to the introduction of the undistributed proﬁts tax, the price of tangible
capital is one minus the tax rate on dividends. A rise in the tax rate from 10 percent to
30 percent implies a 22 percent decline in the price of capital. If the tax proceeds are
rebated to households, then the government becomes a shareholder owning 22 percent of
the business, and the capital stock is not permanently changed. For shareholders facing
the highest surtax rate (75 percent), the impact on their equity values would be large.
Overall, the results show that the extended model’s predictions for the impact of
taxation are greater than those of the basic growth model. And the impact is nontrivial,
especially for tangible investment and hours of work.
3.6. Sensitivity Analysis
Finally, I investigate the sensitivity of the extended model results to the choice of house-
hold expectations (as detailed in Table 2) and several parameters related to intangible
investment for which I have little independent evidence. I now vary these assumptions to
see if that signiﬁcantly changes the results about capital taxation’s role in the 1930s. It
does not.
I compute the model’s equilibrium for three alternative assumptions about household
expectations. One is the benchmark used in the initial simulation. A second is to assume
that in 1930, households put the probability of staying with 1930 policy at 100 percent; the
same can be said for 1931. The transition matrix for 1932 and after is the same as in Table
2. I call this Myopic, 1930–1931. The third alternative is to assume perfect foresight, that
households have full knowledge of the path of spending and tax rates. I call this Perfect
Foresight, 1930–1939.
21As is clear in Figure 11, the model’s predictions of tangible investment do seem diﬀer-
ent for the diﬀerent assumptions. If households place no probabilistic weight on the higher
tax rates of the 1930s, as is true in the myopic example, then tangible investment does not
fall initially as much as it does in the benchmark. However, there is still a ﬁrst-order eﬀect
on investment and one much larger than the basic growth model prediction. If households
have perfect foresight, then they react immediately and sharply to the news by setting
tangible investment to zero. It is not shown in the ﬁgure, but intangible investment in the
perfect foresight case also falls dramatically, roughly 50 percent, in the ﬁrst year.
Another diﬀerence worth noting about the perfect foresight case is the reaction to news
about the undistributed proﬁts tax. In the benchmark simulation, this tax is completely
unanticipated. In the perfect foresight case, it is completely anticipated. Thus, there is a
sharp rise in tangible investment between 1931 and 1935, with a dramatic fall when the
tax is in eﬀect.
In McGrattan (2010), I rerun the experiments using diﬀerent values for the fraction
of expensing done by shareholders (χ) and the depreciation rate on intangible capital
(δI). The model’s predictions are close to indistinguishable from those shown in Figures 5
through 10.
Overall, the sensitivity analysis shows that varying assumptions about household ex-
pectations and parameters related to intangible investment does not overturn the main
conclusion that capital taxation played a signiﬁcant role in the Great Depression.
4. Conclusion
Many theories have been proposed for the large contraction of the 1930s and the slow
recovery thereafter. Absent in the theories of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Cole and Ohanian (2004), and many others is any role for ﬁscal policy
22in this decade. This paper challenges the conventional view that ﬁscal policy played little
or no role. Tax rates on dividends rose signiﬁcantly during the decade and, when fed into
the basic growth model, imply a large drop in tangible investments and equity values. In
the later part of the 1930s, tax rates on undistributed proﬁts were introduced and led to
another dramatic decline in tangible investment.
Although the results show that capital taxation during the U.S. Great Depression
had large eﬀects, it could not be the only overlooked factor in the analysis of the period.
According to model simulations, predicted consumption counterfactually rises before 1932,
with households anticipating some increases in income taxes and sales taxes. This deviation
is also evident in standard theories of ﬁnancial frictions and remains a challenge for those
interested in accounting for the dramatic contraction in the early 1930s.
23Appendix
The main source for the data used in this study is the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which publishes the U.S. national accounts and
ﬁxed asset tables in the Survey of Current Business (available online at www.bea.gov),
SCB hereafter. In this appendix, I provide details on the data used and the necessary
adjustments that are made to make the model accounts consistent with the U.S. accounts.
A.1. National Accounts and Fixed Assets
The main components of GDP are found in Table 1.1.5 of the national income and product
accounts (NIPA) from the SCB (1929–2010). GDP in the business sector is set equal to
value added of corporations and nonfarm proprietorships.
A.1.1. Components of GDP
Consumption is deﬁned to be personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and ser-
vices, adjusted to include consumer durable services and to exclude sales tax. (Details
of these adjustments are described below.) Investment is deﬁned to be the sum of gross
private domestic investment, government investment, net exports, and personal consump-
tion expenditures on durables after subtracting sales taxes. Business tangible investment
is deﬁned to be the part of investment made by corporations and nonfarm proprietors.
Nonbusiness investment is residually deﬁned as investment less business tangible invest-
ment. Government spending is deﬁned to be government consumption expenditures. All
components of GDP are deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator (in Table 1.1.9) and population at
midperiod (Table 2.1). The series are then divided by the growth in labor-augmenting
technical change (1 + γt).
Components of GDP treated exogenously and used as inputs to the computation are
also ﬁltered using the algorithm proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997). I set their
smoothing parameter (λ) equal to 1. The detrended and ﬁltered government spending
series is shown in Table A.1. The detrended, ﬁltered nonbusiness investment and output
are shown in Table A.2. In McGrattan (2010) I plot all of the smoothed inputs along with
the original time series.
24A.1.2. Adjustments to Accounts
Two adjustments are made to GDP and its components to make them consistent with
the model accounts: sales taxes are subtracted and services for consumer durables and
government capital are added.
Sales Taxes. Unlike the NIPA, the model output does not include consumption taxes
as part of consumption and as part of value added. I therefore subtract sales and ex-
cise taxes from the NIPA data on taxes on production and imports and from personal
consumption expenditures, since these taxes primarily aﬀect consumption expenditures.
Fixed Asset Expenditures. I treat expenditures on all ﬁxed assets as investment.
Thus, spending on consumer durables is treated as an investment rather than as a con-
sumption expenditure and moved from the consumption category to the investment cate-
gory. The consumer durables services sector is introduced in the same way as the NIPA
introduces owner-occupied housing services. Households rent the consumer durables to
themselves. Speciﬁcally, I add depreciation of consumer durables to consumption of ﬁxed
capital of households and to private consumption. I add imputed additional capital ser-
vices for consumer durables to capital income and to private consumption. I assume a rate
of return on this capital equal to 4.1 percent, which is an estimate of the return on other
types of capital. A related adjustment is made for government capital. Speciﬁcally, I add
imputed additional capital services for government capital to capital income and to public
consumption.
A.2. Hours Per Capita
The primary source of the hours series is the work of Kendrick (1961), Table A-X, total
manhours. Nonbusiness hours are the sum of hours in the government and farm sectors.
Business hours are total hours less nonbusiness hours. For per capita hours, I divide the
manhours series by the population age 16 and over. The population series is Series A39 of
the Historical Statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce (1975).
A.3. Market Value
The total market value of U.S. corporations is available from the Federal Reserve Board’s
Flow of Funds starting in 1945. Before then, we have data only on subsets of stocks. Here,
25Table A.1. Spending and Tax Rates in the Basic Growth Model
Detrended Tax Rates on
Government
Year Spending Wages Proﬁts
1929 5.8 3.3 28.1
1930 6.2 3.6 28.6
1931 6.7 4.2 30.4
1932 7.1 5.2 34.0
1933 7.4 6.3 38.4
1934 7.7 7.2 41.1
1935 7.9 7.6 42.9
1936 8.0 7.9 44.2
1937 8.1 8.1 43.9
1938 8.3 8.3 43.1
1939 8.6 8.5 43.2
I use the market value of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
available in the Survey of Current Business: Annual Supplements (1932–2000). As Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2004) show, ﬂuctuations in the total market value and the NYSE
market value track each other closely in the post-1945 period. (See, in particular, that
study’s Figure 2.)
A.4. Tax Rates
To compute an equilibrium in the basic growth model (Section 2), I use estimates of
marginal tax rates on capital and labor from the work of Joines (1981), speciﬁcally MTRK1
and MTRL1 shown in Table A.2 (along with the government spending series deﬁned above).
As with the other exogenous inputs, I ﬁlter these rates using the method of Hodrick and
Prescott (1997). (See McGrattan 2010 for ﬁgures of the ﬁltered and unﬁltered series.)
In the second series of numerical exercises (Figures 5–11), I use the Joines (1981)
MTRL1 for the tax on labor income, but I do not use MTRK1 for capital income. Instead,
I include diﬀerent rates for proﬁts, dividends, and property. These rates are reported in
26Table A.2. Nonbusiness Activity in the Extended Model
Year Hours Investment Output
1929 7.4 15.0 36.3
1930 7.3 12.3 34.1
1931 7.2 9.9 32.6
1932 7.1 7.8 31.2
1933 7.0 7.0 30.4
1934 7.1 7.6 30.3
1935 7.2 9.1 31.0
1936 7.2 10.6 31.9
1937 7.2 11.8 32.3
1938 7.1 12.5 32.5
1939 7.0 13.4 32.6
Table A.3. Additional Tax Rates in the Extended Model
Tax Rates on
Year Proﬁtsa Dividends Property Consumption
1929 11.1 9.1 1.4 2.7
1930 11.8 9.6 1.6 3.0
1931 12.5 11.5 1.7 3.6
1932 13.2 15.6 1.8 4.5
1933 15.6 19.2 1.8 5.6
1934 15.7 22.8 1.8 6.6
1935 16.0 26.0 1.7 7.0
1936 16.7 28.7 1.7 7.1
1937 17.9 28.2 1.7 7.1
1938 19.9 26.8 1.6 7.2
1939 22.2 27.3 1.6 7.3
a This rate replaces the rate in Table A.1 and includes taxes on proﬁts, capital stock, and excess proﬁts.
27Table A.3. All have been ﬁltered. The proﬁts tax rate that I use is the statutory rate
reported in the U.S. Treasury’s Statistics of Income.
The capital stock tax and excess proﬁts tax are treated in combination like a tax on
business proﬁts, as suggested by Brown (1949). In Table A.3, two percentage points have
been added to the smoothed statutory proﬁts tax in the years 1933–1939.
The source of the dividend tax is the 2003 work of McGrattan and Prescott, who
compute an average weighted marginal tax rate. In other words, a tax rate on dividend
income is computed using data for each income group from the Statistics of Income. A
weighted average is computed using the fraction of dividend income per income group as
the weighting factor.
In the last two columns of Table A.3 are property and consumption tax rates con-
structed from NIPA data on taxes on production and imports. To construct a rate for the
property tax, I divide the property tax revenues for corporations and nonfarm proprietors
by the sum of the capital stocks of corporations and nonfarm proprietors. To construct a
rate for the tax on consumption, I divide the sales and excise tax revenues by the measure
of consumption deﬁned above.
Finally, the undistributed proﬁts tax is set equal to 5 percent in the years 1936 through
1938. This rate implies a ratio of revenues for the undistributed proﬁts tax relative to the
total corporate proﬁts taxes in the model that is roughly equal to the ratios reported in
the Statistics of Income.
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Figure 1. Detrended Real Investment in the United States






















Figure 2. Hours Per Capita in the United States and the























Figure 3. Detrended Real GDP in the United States























Figure 4. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States



























Figure 5. Detrended Real Investment in the United States






















Figure 6. Hours Per Capita in the United States and the























Figure 7. Detrended Real GDP in the United States























Figure 8. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States
























Figure 9. Detrended Real Tangible and Intangible Investment


























Figure 10. Detrended Real Market Value of the New York



























Figure 11. Detrended Real Tangible Investment in the
Extended Growth Model, 1929–1939
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